Title
Bargaining power and U.S. military aid in the post-cold war era
Authors
[ 1 ] International Studies, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, No.8 Chongwen Road, 215123, Suzhou, China
Year of publication
2021
Published in
Article type
scientific article
Publication language
english
Keywords
EN
- United States
- Bargaining
- Military aid
- Post-Cold War
- Stochastic Frontier
Abstract
EN This study examines the effect of bargaining power on the allocation of U.S. military assistance. Conceptualising U.S. military assistance as an aid-for-policy deal, it applies a two-tiered stochastic frontier model to a data sample of the post-Cold War era. It shows that the bargaining effect accounts for a huge variation in U.S. military aid distribution. The volume of U.S. military assistance in equilibrium is lower than the baseline volume by 4% at the mean and by 6% at the median. The donor U.S. extracts a slightly larger portion of the transaction surplus at these central points. However, the game of surplus division is not always about equally strong hagglers as it may first appear. In fact, the quartile values show substantial variance in bargaining performance and, hence, an outcome of surplus division across transactions. The bargaining effect is highly significant in the allocation of U.S. military assistance in the post-Cold War era. The donor U.S enjoys a bargaining advantage at the mean and median, but rich variations are noticeable.
Date of online publication
09.09.2021
Pages (from - to)
7 - 23
License type
CC BY (attribution alone)
Open Access Mode
open journal
Open Access Text Version
final published version
Release date
09.09.2021
Ministry points / journal
70
Ministry points / journal in years 2017-2021
70
This website works thanks to the software SINUS
created by Poznan Supercomputing and Networking Center
Log in to submit to SIS: