2024

Security and Defence Quarterly

Rocznik: 2024 | Tom: vol. 46 | Numer: no. 2

artykuł naukowy

angielski

EN The aim of this paper is to examine the lessons learned till mid-2023 from the war in Ukraine to find out how attacking or seizing nuclear power plants (NPPs) can be utilised to advance military and political objectives during an armed conflict. The qualitative research approach has been applied to the study, focusing on an analysis of academic research and relevant acts of international law. In order to examine Russia’s approach to the attacks against the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia NPPs, numerous reports, official statements by the authorities, press releases, and Internet sources have been analysed. For evaluation of nuclear security and safety standards in Ukraine, the “seven pillars” model proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency has been adopted. The study indicates that strategically located NPPs can be used as “nuclear shields” for the occupying forces deployed at the plant or nearby. They may also become useful tools of “lawfare” waged with the use of flawed interpretations of international humanitarian law. Finally, nuclear security-related narrations analysed in the paper clearly prove that seized NPPs can be effectively used in information warfare. The research leads to the conclusion that civil NPPs in war zones can be weaponised and exploited by the hostile forces not only for impeding energy supplies (and thus shattering the public morale of the adversary) but also for blackmailing and coercing the decisionmakers of the attacked state and their international allies with a vision of man-made nuclear disaster.

27.11.2023

84 - 103

10.35467/sdq/174810

https://securityanddefence.pl/pdf-174810-97113

CC BY (uznanie autorstwa)

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27.11.2023

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